Right-wing authoritarianism and stereotype-driven expectations interact in shaping intergroup trust in one-shot vs multiple-round social interactions by Ponsi, Giorgia et al.
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Right-wing authoritarianism and stereotype-
driven expectations interact in shaping
intergroup trust in one-shot vs multiple-round
social interactions
Giorgia Ponsi1,2☯*, Maria Serena Panasiti1,2☯*, Salvatore Maria Aglioti1,2, Marco
Tullio Liuzza1,2,3
1 Department of Psychology, University of Rome “Sapienza”, Rome, Italy, 2 Social and Cognitive
Neuroscience Laboratory, IRCCS Fondazione Santa Lucia, Rome, Italy, 3 Department of Medical and
Surgical Sciences, “Magna Graecia” University of Catanzaro, Loc. Germaneto, Catanzaro
☯ These authors contributed equally to this work.
* giorgia.ponsi@uniroma1.it (GP); mariaserena.panasiti@uniroma1.it (MSP)
Abstract
Trust towards unrelated individuals is often conditioned by information about previous social
interactions that can be derived from either personal or vicarious experience (e.g., reputa-
tion). Intergroup stereotypes can be operationalized as expectations about other groups’
traits/attitudes/behaviors that heavily influence our behavioral predictions when interacting
with them. In this study we investigated the role of perceived social dimensions of the Ste-
reotype Content Model (SCM)–Warmth (W) and Competence (C)—in affecting trusting
behavior towards different European national group members during the Trust Game.
Given the well-known role of ideological attitudes in regulating stereotypes, we also mea-
sured individual differences in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). In Experiment 1, we
designed an online survey to study one-shot intergroup trust decisions by employing puta-
tive members of the European Union states which were also rated along SCM dimensions.
We found that low-RWA participants’ trusting behavior was driven by perceived warmth
(i.e., the dimension signaling the benevolence of social intentions) when interacting with
low-C groups. In Experiment 2, we investigated the dynamics of trust in a multiple-round ver-
sion of the European Trust Game. We found that in low-RWA participants trusting behavior
decreased over time when interacting with high-W groups (i.e., expected to reciprocate
trust), but did not change when interacting with low-W groups (i.e., expected not to recipro-
cate trust). Moreover, we found that high-RWA participants’ trusting behavior decreased
when facing low-W groups but not high-W ones. This suggests that low-RWA individuals
employ reputational priors but are also permeable to external evidence when learning about
others’ trustworthiness. In contrast, high-RWA individuals kept relying on stereotypes
despite contextual information. These results confirm the pivotal role played by reputational
priors triggered by perceived warmth in shaping social interactions.
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Introduction
Social decisions are described as choices that influence both ourselves and other individuals,
and are consequently affected by both self- and other-regarding preferences [1]. Importantly,
social decisions are usually taken in interpersonal contexts that include other social agents
whose mental states, intentions and future behaviors are characterized by uncertainty [2].
In humans, widespread altruism toward genetically unrelated individuals probably required
the evolution of specific psychological tools [3]. One of these tools is represented by trust, that
is the willingness to take the risk of helping another individual despite the possibility of not
being helped back [4]. Paradigms from experimental economics (Game Theory[5]) provide an
ecologically valid way to determine social preferences in the laboratory setting, and how social
decisions can be influenced by dispositional and situational factors [6–8]. In particular, deci-
sions to trust and to reciprocate trust are usually investigated by employing the Trust Game
(TG[9]). The TG can be played both as single-round game in which participants take decisions
only once (i.e., one-shot decisions) and as multiple-round game in which decisions are re-iter-
ated several times. Interestingly, these variants strongly affect both optimal and actual game
strategies because of the effect of potential consequences on current choices [10].
On the one hand, behavioral Game Theory [11] predicts that—when playing only once—a
rational and selfish trustee will never pay back the investor. Therefore a rational investor
should invest nothing in the first place [4]. Despite these assumptions, a majority of investors
are prone to send some money to the trustee (approximately half of their endowment) and this
trust is usually reciprocated [11]. On the other hand, during repeated social interactions,
choices change continuously as knowledge about others’ trustworthiness are incrementally
updated via reinforcement learning mechanisms [12]. In fact, trust towards other individuals
is often conditioned by information about previous interactions; this information can be
inferred from either personal experience (direct reciprocity) or vicarious experience (i.e., repu-
tation; indirect reciprocity, for reviews see [13,14]).
The role of vicarious experience in shaping trusting behaviors has been highlighted by stud-
ies that showed how trustees’ actual behavior is not the only factor that predicts our decisions
on whether to trust or not them during a TG [15,16]. For instance, trustees’ race and face emo-
tional expressions can strongly modulate social decisions [17].
Crucially, stereotypes can be operationalized as expectations about other people’s behavior
that—in turn—can heavily influence our predictions [18]. Previous findings highlighted that
behavioral predictions strongly rely on inferences about traits, social categories, reputation
and physical features, that guide decision-making processes when we face a person or a group
[2]. Stereotype Content Model (SCM[19]) is a psychological theory that proposes the mecha-
nisms trough which societal stereotypes are built and their relation to the actual social struc-
ture. According to the SCM, two basic dimensions of social perception—Warmth (W) and
Competence (C)—are employed in order to form impressions or interpret behavior of other
individuals/groups. More specifically, W is used as a social cue to predict conspecifics’ per-
ceived intent (e.g., to help or to harm) and is related to perceived interdependence (coopera-
tive-competitive), while C is used as an index of the ability to enact perceived intentions and is
related to perceived socio-economic status [20–22]. SCM also describes how stereotype’s con-
tent generates distinct emotions felt toward different social groups (BIAS map [20]): high W-
high C (admired groups, like the in-group and the aspirational groups); low W-high C (envied
groups, like Asians, Jews and rich people); high W-low C (paternalized groups, like elderly and
disabled); low W-low C (derogated social groups, like homeless people, poor people and
immigrants).
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Evidence for group-based trust emerges from data suggesting that in-group trustees are pre-
ferred over out-group ones because of the group heuristic-based trust, i.e. the expectation that a
fellow in-group member will act in a fair and reciprocal manner [23,24]. Moreover, the degree
of racial bias seems to be a modulator of economic behavior in intergroup contexts, since par-
ticipants with a greater implicit bias (as measured by IAT [25]) decide to behave less fairly in
the Ultimatum game (an economic game generally employed to study resources allocation and
altruistic punishment behavior [26,27]) and to invest less on out-groups in the TG [28].
The present study aims to assess the role of perceived SCM social dimensions (Warmth and
Competence) in making economic decisions with putative players belonging to different social
groups when playing the Trust Game [9]. In fact, few studies investigated the role of SCM
dimensions in economic decision-making. Competence-based trust seems to represent a well-
preserved mechanism to favor high-competence/status members. Consistently, a previous
study found that low-C group members (Southern Italians) invested more money on high-C
out-group members (Northern Italians) than on low-C in-group ones [29]. This is not surpris-
ing, considering that the reliance on status when deciding to trust is already present in early
childhood [30] and affects the way resources are allocated in real-world financial interactions
[31]. It is worth noting, however, that warmth-related cues are often prioritized respect to
competence-related cues when taking trust-related investment decisions, supporting the pri-
macy of warmth hypothesis [32,33].
SCM social dimensions do not seem to be universally employed in the same way, since
their use is heavily affected by individual differences. Recently, we reported a differential
employment of these two social dimensions during a categorization task in participants who
tend to include (by using a warmth-centered decision criterion) or exclude (by using a compe-
tence-centered decision criterion) new members from their in-group [34,35]. Moreover, using
the Temptation to Lie Card Game [36–38] we showed that perceived warmth and competence
differentially influenced the tendency to deceive others and the impact of reputation on decep-
tion [39]. In particular, we found that perceived warmth decreased the amount of self-gain lies
while perceived competence increased it and that the impact of reputation on deception was
higher when participants were playing with participants perceived low in both dimensions.
A recent study showed that the association between status and competence—but not status
and warmth—is moderated by ideological beliefs and attitudes toward inequality [40], suggest-
ing that political ideology might affect not only the way we use stereotypes, but the content of
the stereotypes that we attach on different groups. This suggests that when investigating the
relationship between stereotypes and perceived SCM social dimensions, it is crucial to take
into consideration also individual differences in political ideology. Oldmeadow and Fiske [40]
investigated the interaction between SCM and Belief in a Just World [41] and Social Domi-
nance Orientation (SDO[42]), but not Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA[43]), which,
together with SDO trait, represents a core aspect of political conservatism and a predictor of
intergroup bias [44–46]. The relationship among individual differences in RWA, SCM dimen-
sions and stereotyping has not been extensively investigated in the previous studies.
Crucially, RWA is especially interesting since it is an ideological attitude strongly related to
prejudice directed towards other groups [47]. Right-wing authoritarians are in fact character-
ized by (i) higher level of prejudice and conservative political attitudes [48], (ii) willingness to
reward group-consistent behaviors and punish inconsistent ones [49], (iii) readiness to be hos-
tile and punitive towards threatening or unconventional others [43], (iv) greater reliance on
heuristic processing and rigidity in categorization [49,50], (v) intolerance to ambiguity [51],
(vi) low levels of openness to experience, high levels of conscientiousness and neuroticism
[52], and (vii) proneness to established authorities and a strong adherence to societal conven-
tions [43].
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Intergroup responses often require self-regulation mechanisms in order to inhibit biases; in
particular, prejudice control refers to responding with egalitarian intentions despite the activa-
tion of automatic stereotypes. Social psychology research highlighted that low-prejudiced peo-
ple are motivated to exert control on their intergroup responses, whereas highly-prejudiced
people are not [53]. On the political spectrum, liberals are usually better than conservatives at
responding without prejudice [54,55], probably because egalitarian ideology motivates them to
downplay their bias, especially towards low status/low competence groups.
The present study aims to assess the role of perceived SCM social dimensions (Warmth and
Competence) and of ideological attitudes (Right-Wing Authoritarianism) in making economic
decisions with putative players belonging to different European national groups when playing
the Trust Game [9]. Since the variant (i.e., one-shot vs multiple-rounds) of the game pro-
foundly affects the strategies employed by participants, we employed both in two different
experiments. In Experiment 1 we employed a one-shot version of the Trust Game played with
trustees from other European Union countries, in order to test how trust is generally affected
by intergroup stereotypes about warmth and competence without any behavioral feedback
from the trustees. We hypothesized that subjective perception of SCM social dimensions (W
and C) would be able to explain differences in participants’ trusting behavior. Since both
warmth and competence represent pivotal dimensions of social cognition [56], we expected
that groups perceived high in both dimensions would be the more trusted. Concerning indi-
vidual differences in RWA, we expected that low-RWA participants—considering their higher
egalitarian motivation—would tend to regulate their stereotypes more than high-RWA ones,
in agreement with the role of ideological attitudes in the stereotype inhibition process [55,57].
Since during prolonged social interactions decision strategies are updated over time depending
on information about others’ trustworthiness [12], in Experiment 2, we employed a multiple-
round version of the Trust Game, in order to test whether stereotypes about warmth and
competence would affect intergroup trust also during interactions characterized by neutral
behavioral feedbacks from putative players from Italy (ingroup), Germany (low-W, high-C
outgroup) and Greece (high-W, low-C outgroup). In keeping with studies showing that both
authoritarianism and conservatism involve resistance to change [46], we expected that low-
RWA players would adjust their behavioral strategy according to others’ feedback, while high-
RWA participants would tend not to learn from the neutral reciprocation feedback and would
rely on their prejudices more than low-RWA participants. Materials, data and analysis scripts
of both experiments are available on Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/d8uen/?view_
only=d896c19f753c4978ba8ffbb9b22eb0bb.
Material and methods
Experiment 1
Participants. 64 Italian participants (37 male, age range 18–52 years, M = 31.84,
SD = 7.45) were recruited by posting an invitation to complete an online experiment pictured
on CrowdFlower website. Crowdsourcing platforms like CrowdFlower and Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk represent viable alternatives for high quality data collection [58–62]. A control ques-
tion (If you are correctly reading this question, instead of using the rating scale, please write down
in the text box “Other”:“I have carefully read”) was included in order to exclude participants
who were not sufficiently focused on the experiment; we excluded 14 participants for this rea-
son. The data of 50 participants (27 male, age range 18–52 years, M = 31.86, SD = 8.05) were
used for the analyses. Sample size was not determined by power analysis but it was similar to
that of other studies investigating SCM dimensions and decision-making [32,33]. Participants
were informed that they would receive a basic compensation of €1 for their time plus a variable
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compensation ranging from €2 to €3 depending on their decisions; they were reimbursed
accordingly (M = 2.81€, S.D. = 0.39). The study was approved by the local ethics committee of
Istituto di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico Fondazione Santa Lucia, and was performed
in accordance with ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki after obtaining writ-
ten informed consent from each participant.
Task and design. The survey was composed of 28 consecutive rounds of the Trust Game
(TG[9]) with different counterparts belonging to the 28 European Union Member States. In
our adapted version (see Fig 1A), during each trial the participant (i.e., the investor) was
endowed with €1 and could decide whether to invest €0 or €1 in the trustee. Once invested,
money was multiplied by four, becoming an amount of €0 or €4, depending on the investor’s
initial choice. Participants were informed that the trustees previously made a series of hypo-
thetical choices recorded in our database; in particular, they recorded what they would have
done if they had received an investment of €1. The trustee had to decide whether to keep for
him/herself the entire amount of money or to reciprocate trust by returning half of the sum
(e.g., €2 in the case of an original investment of €1). The decision to invest €1 represents a
risky choice: if the investor made an investment of €1 and the trustee returns half of the sum,
both players end up with a payoff higher than the original endowment; on the other hand, if
the trustee abuses the trust, the investor gains nothing. At the beginning, participants were pre-
sented with detailed instructions (see Supporting Information, S1 Text, Experiment 1 Instruc-
tions). During each trial of the economic game, participants were presented with the flag
image (size: 150 X 101 pixel) of the specific country (e.g., France) together with the following
reminder: “In the case that this trial will be extracted for determining your additional compensa-
tion, remember that if you will decide to invest €0, you will gain €1, while if you will decide to
invest €1, the gain will depend on the trustee: if he/she will reciprocate your trust, you will gain
€2, while if he/she will decide to not reciprocate your trust, you will gain €0. How much do you
want to invest in a person coming from FRANCE?”. At this point, participants had to choose
between the two forced alternatives of €0 and €1. Importantly, they were informed that the
extracted trial would be employed to determine the final compensation for them and the
Fig 1. (A) Trust Game decision tree representing all the possible outcomes of the one-shot version of the
game (Experiment 1). (B) Trust Game decision tree representing all the possible outcomes of the multiple-
round version of the game (Experiment 2). Pi is the payoff of the participants who always played the role of
investor, Pt is the payoff of the other player who always plays the role of trustee.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190142.g001
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player they were interacting with (implying real monetary consequences for both of them).
Unbeknown to the participants, the game took place against a PC device. For a detailed view
of the TG decision tree, please see Fig 1A. After the Trust Game, participants rated people
coming from the 28 European Union Member States along the warmth (“How warm (i.e.,
friendly, likeable) do you think a person coming from ___ is?”) and competence (“How compe-
tent (i.e., able, rational and dominant) do you think a person coming from ___ is?”) dimensions
on 16-points Likert-type scales. Finally, they completed the RWA Scale (Right-Wing Authori-
tarianism Scale[43,63,64]).
In order to determine the final compensation, we did not extract a random trial but we
decided to insert an additional 29th trial in which participants played against a hypothetical
participant coming from Switzerland (a European Country that does not belong to the Euro-
pean Union). 52 of the 64 participants of the entire sample (and 42 of the 50 participants of the
analyzed sample) decided to invest in the Swiss person, so they gained €3, while the partici-
pants who decided to not invest in the Swiss person gained €2.
Data analysis. Since the use of ANOVA on frequencies is inappropriate [65], analyses on
investments were performed using logit mixed models. Ratings on liking and friendliness were
averaged into a unique Warmth measure. Ratings on Competence were obtained by averaging
competence, rationality and dominance (since the latter has been found constantly correlated
to competence [19,22,66]) (see Supporting Information, S1 Table, for descriptive information
about warmth and competence ratings). The mean score of the 10 items RWA Scale ([63,64];
Cronbach’s α = .77) was of 3.85 (SD = .84), on a 7-points Likert-type scale.
Results
One-shot TG. To estimate the intercept-only model, we fitted our data in a generalized
linear model by the glm function in R [67]. Then, we ran Generalized Mixed Linear-Effects
(MLE, binomial family) by using glmer function from the lme4 R package [67,68], with one
dependent variable (Invest/Not-Invest decision) and three predictor-independent covariates
(Warmth, Competence, RWA) with all the reciprocal interactions. Participants were entered
as random factors and fixed effects were also modeled as random slopes over participants [69].
We found that both Warmth and Competence represent significant predictors of trusting
behavior (Warmth: χ2(1) = 21.37, p< .001; Competence: χ2(1) = 28.62, p< .001). Also the
two-way interaction between warmth and competence is significant (χ2(1) = 10.66, p = .001).
Despite RWA predictor itself does not reach significance (RWA: χ2(1) = 0.40, p = .525), its
interaction with warmth (χ2(1) = 4.94, p = .026) and competence (χ2(1) = 5.38, p = .020) seems
to significantly predict participants’ investment behavior in the Trust Game. All these main
effects and two-way interactions are qualified by a significant three-way interaction among
warmth, competence and RWA (χ2(1) = 8.25,p = .004).
We also tested the simple effects of the triple interaction in a regression model (including
also the random effects) by means of the function simple slopes included in the R package
reghelper. The simple slopes for the association between warmth and trusting behavior were
tested for low (-1 SD below the mean) and high (+1 SD above the mean) levels of the two other
continuous variables (competence and RWA).
The analysis showed that when both groups’ perceived competence and investor’s RWA
score are low, there is a significant relationship between warmth and trusting behavior
(b = 1.31, SE = .27, t = 4.83, upper CI = 1.84, lower CI = .78, see Fig 2, low-C/low-RWA). The
combinations high-C/high-RWA (b = .205, SE = .16, t = 1.31, upper CI = .51, lower CI = -.10),
high-C/low-RWA (b = -.03, SE = .21, t = -.16, upper CI = .37, lower CI = -.44) and low-C/
Right-wing authoritarianism and stereotype-driven expectations shape intergroup trust
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Fig 2. Predicted probability to invest in the Trust Game when considering the three-way interaction among
Warmth, Competence and RWA. Predictions are based on estimates derived from the simple slopes analysis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190142.g002
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high-RWA (b = .27, SE = .23, t = 1.17, upper CI = .72, lower CI = -.18) did not entail significant
effects.
In particular, the three-way interaction shows that, when playing against low-C groups,
low-RWA participants were driven by perceived warmth: they tended to trust high-W/low-C
members and to distrust low-W/low-C ones (see Fig 2, Low-C/Low-RWA). This signals
that low-RWA participants are particularly sensitive to warmth dimension (at least when inter-
acting with low-C social groups), in agreement with its role in predicting the goodness of oth-
ers’ intentions. No behavioral pattern was significant in participants who scored higher in
RWA (see Fig 2).
Discussion
In Experiment 1 we investigated the role of perceived SCM social dimensions (Warmth and
Competence) and of ideological attitudes (Right-Wing Authoritarianism) in making economic
decisions with putative players belonging to European Union national countries when playing
a single-round version of the Trust Game [9]. Our findings suggest that the perceived social
dimensions described by SCM [19] are able to impact participants’ investment behavior when
taking one-shot trust decisions.
We found that participants were more likely to invest in trustees from national groups per-
ceived high in warmth and competence (in agreement with SCM predictions about the role of
warmth and competence in inter-group social cognition; [19,56]). This finding is also in line
with a recent work reporting that individuals have shared stereotypes in terms of expected
cooperation for interaction partners from different countries and that these stereotype-driven
expectations represent the strongest predictor of participants’ actual cooperation [70]. In addi-
tion, we showed that individual differences in Right-Wing Authoritarianism interacted with
SCM social dimensions in shaping intergroup decision-making. On the one hand, we found
that low-RWA participants’ investment behavior was guided by perceived warmth dimension,
but only when facing low-C groups (i.e., high-W/low-C social groups). On the other hand,
low-RWA participants seem to adopt stereotypical behavior when facing members of low-W/
low-C social groups, by investing less money on them. This finding shows that when low-
RWA participants face low-C groups’ members, trust is enhanced only when the trustees are
characterized by a positive reputational prior (i.e., high ratings of W that signal good social
intentions).
Contrary to our expectations, we did not find evidence of stereotypical behavior in high-
RWA participants. This is in line with recent findings suggesting that conservatives do not dif-
fer from liberals when considering the amount of prejudice toward dissimilar social targets
[71]. Alternatively, it has been shown that the relationship between authoritarianism and the
expression of prejudice might be determined by the presence of an authority’s explicit instruc-
tion [72], which in our case was not present. Thus, it is entirely possible that stereotypes
regarding the other player were not sufficient to trigger any discriminatory behavior in high-
RWA participants.
In this first experiment, we employed an online survey because we aimed at testing whether
the pattern of immediate one-shot trust decisions toward players of different European Union
national countries would follow the intergroup stereotypes defined by the SCM [19]. In the
second study, we aimed to test how intergroup stereotypes could drive participants’ invest-
ment behavior over time when provided with information about the outcome of other players’
decisions (i.e., reciprocation vs defection). So, in order to broaden the findings of Experiment
1, we designed a multiple-round (i.e., decisions are re-iterated several times) onsite behavioral
experiment to further investigate intergroup trust behavior and the role of authoritarianism by
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PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190142 December 28, 2017 8 / 23
employing a representative sub-sample of putative players of the European Union member
states. In particular, we implemented in the Trust Game a neutral 50% reciprocation rate
(independent from group membership), in order to test whether trust decisions are driven by
investors’ biased interpretation of group members’ reciprocation behavior.
Our predictions were that high-RWA participants would tend not to adjust their behavioral
strategy according to other players’ actual behavior and would hold to their stereotypes more
than low-RWA participants. In addition, since Experiment 1 showed that in low-RWA partici-
pants one-shot trust decisions were driven by perceived warmth (especially when interacting
with low-C group members), we expected that stereotypes about warmth would affect inter-
group trust also during prolonged social interactions characterized by neutral behavioral
feedbacks from the other players. In particular, we hypothesized that expectations about recip-
rocation would be influenced by perceptions of warmth: in fact, according to SCM [19,56], low-
W group members are more likely to be expected to defect (negative prior) and high-W mem-
bers are more likely to be expected to reciprocate (positive prior).
Experiment 2
The present experiment aims to assess the role of perceived SCM social dimensions (Warmth
and Competence) and of ideological attitudes (Right-Wing Authoritarianism) in making eco-
nomic decisions with putative players belonging to different European national groups when
playing a multiple-round version of the Trust Game [9]. Since this was an onsite behavioral
experiment we reduced the number of European countries involved in the experiment in
order to make the cover story believable. In more detail, we selected Italians and two groups
that were among the key characters of the recent European crisis: the “cicadas” Greeks and the
“ants” Germans [73], that were supposed to be perceived either high in warmth (the Greeks)
or in competence (the Germans), respectively.
Participants. 44 students (14 male; age range 19–39 years, M = 24.66, SD = 3.31) of the
University of Rome “Sapienza” voluntarily took part in the experiment. All of them were Ital-
ian, healthy, naïve to the purposes of the study, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Sample size was not determined by power analysis but it was similar to that of other studies
investigating SCM dimensions and decision-making [32,33]. Participants were informed that
they would receive a compensation of €5 for their participation, plus the money gained in one
randomly extracted round of the game; they were reimbursed with an amount between 5 and
12.50 euro (M = 9.81€, SD = 2.14). The study was approved by the local ethics committee of
Istituto di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico Fondazione Santa Lucia, and was performed
in accordance with ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki after obtaining writ-
ten informed consent from each participant.
Task and design. At the beginning of the experiment, participants were told that they
were to take part in a study ran in partnership with the local Italian University, with a Greek
and a German University. The task was based on the Trust Game [9]. In our adapted version
(see Figs 1B and 3), the participant (i.e., the investor) was endowed with €5 before starting a
round composed of two stages: in stage 1, the investor had to decide how much of the €5 to
invest in a partner (i.e., the trustee), making a forced choice between €1 and €5; after the trans-
fer, the money was multiplied by three, becoming an amount of €3 or €15, depending on the
investor’s initial choice. In stage 2, the trustee had to decide whether to return half of the sum
(€1.5 or € 7.5) to the investor or to keep for himself the entire amount of money (€3 or €15).
Participants were informed that the trustees previously made a series of hypothetical choices
recorded in our database; in particular, they recorded what they would have done if they had
received an investment of €1 or €5. The decision to invest €5 represents a risky choice: if the
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investor made an investment of €5 and the trustee returns half of the sum, both players end up
with a payoff higher than the original endowment; on the other hand, if the trustee abuses the
trust, the investor gains nothing.
In order to acquaint with the task, participants were required to have a 6-trial practice ses-
sion, in which they played as both investor and trustee; these trials were anonymous, in that
they did not know the name nor the nationality and the gender of the player they were inter-
acting with. At the beginning of the experimental task, participants were presented with
detailed instructions (see Supporting Information, S2 Text, Experiment 2 Instructions). After-
wards, they were reminded that one round would be randomly extracted in order to determine
the final compensation for them and the player they were interacting with (implying real mon-
etary consequences for both of them).
During the experiment, they played in a multiple round version of the TG, always in the
role of investor, against trustees putatively from: Italy, Greece and Germany. During each trial,
they could see the other player’s name and University (e.g., Alexis—University of Athens) and
they had to press the key “Q” in order to invest €5 and the key “P” to invest €1 (the keys were
assigned to both decisions in a counterbalanced order). The TG was composed by a total of
180 consecutive rounds with different counterparts (i.e., 60 rounds against Italians, 60 rounds
against Greeks and 60 rounds against Germans; for each nation, 30 rounds against males and
30 against females). Experimental trials were presented to participants in a fully randomized
order. Unbeknown to the participants, the game took place against a PC device, which was
programmed to reciprocate them 50% of time, independently of the nationality and gender of
the current player. The TG was presented using E-Prime software 1.2. [74]. After a short
break, participants completed the RWA Scale (Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale; [43,63,64].
One week after the on-site experiment, participants were sent an online survey in which they
had to rate their perceived stereotypes regarding different national groups along several
dimensions (friendliness, liking, competence, rationality, dominance) on 16-points Likert-
type scales.
Fig 3. Exemplar single trial of the multiple round-version of the TG.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190142.g003
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Data analysis. We discarded the responses for which the individual RTs fell below the 5th
and beyond the 95th percentile values (computed on the entire sample of participants) respec-
tively, because we reasoned that during these trials participants either paid too little attention
or engaged too much time in deliberating. Ratings on liking and friendliness were averaged
into a unique Warmth measure, as we did for Competence by averaging competence, rational-
ity and dominance [19,22,66] (see Supporting Information, S3 Text and S1 Fig for additional
analyses on warmth and competence ratings). The mean score of the 10 items RWA Scale
([63,64]; Cronbach’s α = .81) was of 3.03 (SD = 0.95), on a 7-points Likert-type scale. Crucially,
RWA score positively correlates with Political Orientation, measured through a Likert-type
self-report ranging from 1 (extremely left-wing) to 7 (extremely right-wing) (r = .44, p =
.0003).
Results
Multiple-round TG. First, we built a null model by fitting our data in a generalized linear
model by the glm function in R [67], having only the constant as the fixed effect. In order to
account for the subjects’ intercepts as a random variable, we ran Generalized Mixed Linear-
Effects (MLE, binomial family) by using glmer function from the lme4 R package [67,68]. We
modeled one dependent binomial variable (Invest/Not-Invest decision) and four predictors
(Warmth, Competence, RWA, Trial) in the model. Participants were entered as random fac-
tors and fixed effects were also modeled as random slopes over participants [69]. We also
tested all the possible covariates’ reciprocal interactions.
We found a main effect of trial, showing that trust behavior tended to decrease during the
social interaction (χ2(1) = 10.34, p = .001), and a main effect of RWA (χ2(1) = 9.29, p = .002),
showing that the higher the scores on the RWA scale, the lower the probability to trust others
during the multiple-round TG. We also found a two-way interaction between trial and compe-
tence (χ2(1) = 7.74, p = .005). Moreover, this model showed that the investment probability
was entirely explained by the significant three-way interaction effect among Warmth, RWA
and trial number (χ2(1) = 5.82, p = .028). We focused on the higher order triple interaction.
We also tested the simple effects of the triple interaction in a regression model (including
also the random effects) by means of the function simple_slopes included in the R package
reghelper. The simple slopes for the association between trial and trusting behavior were tested
for low (-1 SD below the mean) and high (+1 SD above the mean) levels of the two other con-
tinuous variables (warmth and RWA).
The analysis showed that the combinations High-W/Low-RWA (b = -.02, SE = .01, t =
-2.61, upper CI = -.01, lower CI = -.03) and Low-W/High-RWA (b = -.02, SE = .01, t = -2.51,
upper CI = -.01, lower CI = -.03) both entailed significant results. On the contrary, High-W/
High-RWA (b = -.01, SE = .01, t = -1.92, upper CI = .01, lower CI = -.02) and Low-W/Low-
RWA (b = -.01, SE = .01, t = -.75, upper CI = .01, lower CI = -.02) combinations were not
significant.
Results show that low-RWA participants seem to initially trust more the representatives of
national groups rated high in warmth (irrespectively of competence/status). This kind of posi-
tive bias triggered by warmth is in partial agreement with the findings of Experiment 1, where
the investment behavior of participants toward low-C groups was driven by perceived warmth
(i.e., the more the game partners were rated as warm, the more low-RWA participants invested
money on them). However, as the economical interactions with the high-W partners go on—
showing that they only reciprocate them 50% of time—low-RWA participants’ investment rate
tends to progressively decrease over time (see Fig 4, High-W/Low-RWA). Differently, this
seems not to happen for the low-W group members, since low-RWA participants trust
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Fig 4. Predicted probability to invest in the Trust Game when considering the three-way interaction effect among
Warmth, Trial and RWA. Predictions are based on estimates derived from simple slopes analysis.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0190142.g004
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behavior toward them seems not to vary over time (see Fig 4, Low-W/Low-RWA). Differently,
as the social interactions with the low-W partners went on, high-RWA participants’ trusting
behavior tended to decrease over time (see Fig 4, Low-W/High-RWA; even if also at the begin-
ning of the Trust game, investment rate was inferior to 50% probability). Interestingly, high-
RWA participants did not adjust their behavioral pattern over time when facing high-W mem-
bers (Fig 4, High-W/High-RWA).
Discussion
In Experiment 2 we tested whether the perceived social dimensions of the SCM [19] played a
role in modulating intergroup bias during a multiple-round version of the Trust Game [9], in
which Italian participants interacted with putative members of three different national groups
(Italians, Germans and Greeks). We also explored the role of ideological attitudes (RWA) in
affecting intergroup trust behavior.
Results suggest that participants tended to trust less others over time and also that the
higher the scores on the RWA scale, the lower the probability to trust other players. Moreover,
we found out that low- and high-RWA participants employed different behavioral strategies
during the multi-round Trust Game: low-RWA participants’ investment rate toward high-W
and high-RWA participants’ investment rate toward low-W partners tended to progressively
decrease over time. Low-RWA participants’ behavioral pattern probably has something to do
with different intergroup expectations about trustworthiness and reciprocation: low-W groups
are supposedly expected to not reciprocate back the invested amount of money (since low rat-
ings of warmth are usually associated to bad interpersonal intentions), while high-W groups
are supposedly expected to reciprocate back the invested amount of money (since high ratings
of warmth are usually associated to good interpersonal intentions). It seems that social expec-
tations driven by warmth stereotype and adjustment to others’ reciprocation behavior together
with the willingness to regulate (or not) pre-existing intergroup stereotypes likely interact with
one another in determining the behavioral pattern of individuals. In fact, low-RWA’s egalitar-
ian ideological attitudes seem to aid coping with the automatic reliance on group-related ste-
reotypes by assuming exactly the opposite pattern of behavior (i.e., they do not discriminate
social groups expected to not reciprocate them, as low-W ones); interestingly, the same partici-
pants tend to strongly react to defections coming from members of social groups supposed to
reciprocate them, as high-W ones. The presence of differential discriminatory tendencies
(present for high-W trustees but not for low-W ones) in low-RWA participants could also be
due to differences in stereotype content towards the different social groups and/or to the ste-
reotype endorsement degree towards them. Further, also high-RWA participants showed a
decrease in trusting behavior over time when interacting with low-W social groups’ members,
but here the behavioral adjustment seems to be less dramatic than in low-RWA participants
(i.e. trusting rate was already less than 50% at the beginning of the game). High-RWA partici-
pants’ trusting behavior seemed to follow the social expectations driven by the warmth stereo-
type: in fact, over time they started investing less in low-W groups (i.e. who were expected not
to reciprocate). Importantly, this kind of behavioral adjustment is not present when high-
RWA individuals interact with high-W groups (i.e. who were expected to reciprocate). This
suggests that in the presence of a positive prior, the 50% reciprocation rate is not sufficient to
trigger an adjustment in their trusting behavior.
On the one hand, our findings suggest that low-RWA participants adjusted their trusting
behavior to the context: despite the positive prior associated to high-W social groups, they
started to invest less on them because of their actual reciprocation behavior. On the other
hand, high-RWA participants adjusted their trusting behavior to the expectations triggered by
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the warmth stereotype: despite the same 50% reciprocation behavior, they went on investing
on high-W players but they started to invest less on low-W ones. This behavioral strategy
might be explained by authoritarians’ cognitive features, as a greater reliance on heuristic pro-
cessing [50] and closeness to experience [52]. Consistently with these findings, Republicans
have been recently found to not adjust their trust behavior to different partisan identities [75]
and to show greater persistence in habitual response patterns, as indexed by neural markers of
sensitivity to conflict like Error Related Negativity (ERN; [54]).
General discussion
In this study, we employed two modified versions of the Trust Game [9] to test whether the
perceived social dimensions of the SCM [19] and individual differences in ideological attitude
(i.e., Right-Wing Authoritarianism; [43]) played a role in modulating intergroup trust in one-
shot and multiple-round interactions. We found two interesting patterns of results: one related
to general trust behavior and the other related to how trust is modulated by participants’ ideo-
logical attitude.
Focusing on SCM dimensions [19] and decision-making, we found mixed evidence in the
literature. Trifiletti and Capozza (2011) pointed out that competence dimension drives the
decision to invest in the Trust Game (i.e., social groups characterized by the high-C stereotype
are trusted more), at least in low-C group representatives. Conversely, studies suggested that
trust decisions in interpersonal contexts are mainly guided by warmth dimension [32,33]. On
the one hand, in Experiment 1 we found that both perceived social dimensions (W and C)
were taken into account when deciding to trust someone else during one-shot decisions. On
the other hand, findings from Experiment 2 seem to suggest the existence of a relationship
between warmth and trust—moderated by RWA—in prolonged social interactions character-
ized by neutral behavioral feedbacks.
Few studies investigated how ideology affects social decision-making. Anderson and col-
leagues found that—in iniquitous settings—liberals seem to trust more other players and to
reciprocate them back more than conservative participants [76]. Further, a recent study shows
that Republicans do not adjust their trusting behavior correspondingly to the different partisan
identities, while Democrats trust more fellows of their own political party [75]. According to
the authors, this behavioral pattern is driven by beliefs about partner trustworthiness—reflect-
ing in turn stereotypes about the fellows of the other political party—that are not easily subject
to change [75].
Two key results emerged from our experiments, both suggesting that warmth-related judg-
ments heavily impact trust behavior. Firstly, in Experiment 1, low-RWA participants’ invest-
ment behavior was guided by perceived warmth, but only when facing low competence
groups. In fact, participants trusted social groups rated high in warmth (i.e., high-W/low-C)
but they did not invest in social groups rated low in warmth (i.e., low-W/low-C). This pattern
of results suggests that trusting behavior seems to be driven by perceived (good versus bad)
interpersonal intentions signaled by perceived warmth. Probably the lack of investment
toward low-W/low-C social groups derives from the negative prior (i.e., lower probability to
reciprocate) associated to those players. Also, fairness concerns are even more salient in the
one-shot version of Trust Game (since participants had only a single interaction per group, so
there is an higher risk of fraud), and this probably explains why low-RWA participants did not
invest in them. In agreement, recent theories show that also liberals show similar levels of
intolerance and prejudice as conservatives, especially towards dissimilar and threatening
groups [77–80]. Further, this behavioral pattern might also be driven by stronger concerns
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about others’ fairness that characterize liberal participants [81–84] and made even more salient
in the context of the one-shot version of the Trust Game.
Secondly, in Experiment 2, we found that RWA level and social groups’ perceived warmth
interacted in modulating decision-making over time. In fact, we employed the multiple-round
version of the Trust Game in order to test whether stereotype-driven expectations toward
three different social groups (Italians, Germans and Greeks) modulated trusting behavior dur-
ing repeated interactions over time. Concerning ideological attitude, we found that RWA level
significantly impacts the proneness to trust other players: the higher the RWA scores, the
lower the probability to trust others. We also found that low-RWA participants are initially
characterized by a positive bias towards national groups’ representatives rated high in warmth
(in line with liberals’ preference for warm candidates in the context of political elections [85]),
but as the social interactions go on, their trusting behavior toward high-W partners tended to
progressively decrease over time; interestingly the investment rate toward low-W partners
(who would supposedly be perceived as less cooperative and more competitive) remain quite
stable during the game. We interpreted these unexpected findings by taking into account (i)
low-prejudiced individuals’ motivation to exert control on their intergroup responses [53], (ii)
social expectations triggered by the warmth stereotype, (iii) the stronger permeability of low-
prejudiced individuals to new evidences coming from the actual social interaction and (iv)
recent theoretical developments about liberals intolerance towards dissimilar groups [77–79].
This seems to be also in line with recent neuroscientific findings showing that reputational
priors (i.e., information about individualistic versus cooperative counterpart) overcome part-
ner’s actual behavior in driving decisions to trust [15,16]. Further, reciprocity expectation even
modulate brain electrical activity during the TG: promise-breaking induces larger Feedback
Related Negativity (FRN, an event-related potential usually evoked by unexpected outcomes)
responses to reward and non-reward discrepancies [86] and a reduced reward positivity to loss
feedbacks preceded by trusting decision indexes that lack of reciprocation is unexpected by the
trustor [87]. This is probably due to a sort of social expectancy violation mechanism, whose
existence seems to be supported by neuroscientific evidence indicating that the brain considers
social inconsistencies in a similar way to prediction errors [88–91]. In particular, the update in
the behavioral strategy of low-RWA participants could be due to reward prediction error
mechanisms: probably, low-RWA participants started investing more in high-W groups than
low-W ones because of social expectations. Then, after they realized that reciprocation rate
was around 50%, their investments dropped for high-W groups (since investment rate was
higher than 50%) but not for low-W ones (since investment rate was already around 50%). In
addition, low-RWA participants’ behavior might be explained as a sort of Black Sheep Effect
[92] related to perceptions of warmth: in the case of deviant behavior, despite the well-known
in-group favoritism phenomenon [93], in-group members are derogated more than out-group
ones and are more strongly punished when violating fairness norms [94]. A similar paradoxi-
cal phenomenon emerges in moral dilemmas describing the sacrifice of White versus Black
men, since White liberals decide to sacrifice more likely the White man (Studies 1a and 1b)
[95]. Probably, as Uhlmann and colleagues point out, antipathy toward racial bias and the
associated sensitivity to racial inequality issues both drive liberals’ decisions [95]. This is in
agreement with findings showing that fairness motives are especially grave for political liberals
[96] and that conservatives tend to tolerate social inequality better than liberals [46].
More importantly, low-RWA participants seem more permeable to new evidences coming
from the actual social interaction respect than high-RWA ones, who showed a trusting behav-
ior consistent with the expectation triggered by the warmth stereotype. In fact, high-RWA par-
ticipants showed a decrease in trusting behavior toward low-W groups’ representatives (i.e.
players stereotyped as having bad interpersonal intentions) but not toward high-W ones (i.e.
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players stereotyped as having good interpersonal intentions). Interestingly, the neutral 50%
reciprocation rate is not sufficient to trigger an adjustment in high-RWA behavior toward the
players they expect to behave fairly. Consequently, high-RWA players seem more resistant to
external evidences when playing the Trust Game; this finding is explained by cognitive features
that characterize individuals with authoritarian traits, as heuristic processing [50] and close-
ness to experience [52]. Moreover, conservatives show a greater persistence in habitual
response patterns, while liberals show greater neurocognitive sensitivity to response conflict
and are also more responsive to informational complexity and novelty [54]. In this perspective,
it is not surprising that high-RWA participants do not update their behavioral strategy accord-
ing to external information when they have a positive prior triggered by the high-W expecta-
tion (e.g., their investment patterns do not significantly change over time, irrespectively of
50% reciprocation rate), but they are able to update it when they have a negative prior trig-
gered by the low-W expectation. In agreement with our finding, Republicans have been
recently found to not adjust their trust behavior to different partisan identities [75].
We believe there are three different (but not mutually exclusive) potential mechanisms
explaining our findings: (i) prejudice control/self-regulation, (ii) direct reciprocity (i.e. adjust-
ment to group members’ actual reciprocation behavior) and (iii) indirect reciprocity (i.e. social
expectations driven by stereotype content). Firstly, intergroup responses require prejudice
control/self-regulation in order to inhibit automatic intergroup biases. Since previous research
has shown that low-prejudiced people are more motivated to exert control on their intergroup
responses [53] and are also better than conservatives at responding without prejudice [54,55],
we expected to find a greater amount of distrustful behavior (i.e., investing more often €1
instead of €5) in high-RWA participants respect to low-RWA ones (but see [97] for results
suggesting that conservatives show greater self-control than liberals in cognitive tasks). Since
this is not the case, prejudice control alone cannot be responsible for the behavioral patterns
we observed in both experiments. Secondly, we could expect that participants adjust to other
players’ actual behavior over the trials through reinforcing learning mechanisms [12], in agree-
ment with the direct reciprocity phenomenon [13,14]. However, this explanation does not
fully fit with our findings, since it is true only for low-RWA participants interacting with low-
W group members (and not high-W ones). Finally, our findings can be interpreted through
the social expectation hypothesis, in agreement with the indirect reciprocity phenomenon
[13,14]: social groups perceived higher on warmth dimension are going to attract the higher
amount of trusting behavior, while the groups perceived lower on warmth dimension are
going to be discriminated. Again, this hypothesis does not entirely fit with our findings, since
it is true only for high-RWA participants but not for low-RWA ones. We tend to believe that
the most reasonable interpretation derives from combining all the hypotheses outlined above.
In fact, the willingness to regulate (or not) pre-existing intergroup stereotypes together with
social expectations driven by stereotype content and other players’ reciprocation behavior
likely interact with one another in determining the observed behavioral pattern. For example,
in Experiment 2, low-RWA’s do not discriminate social groups expected to not reciprocate
them (low-W) because their egalitarian ideological attitudes help them coping with automatic
reliance on group-related stereotypes; moreover they strongly react to defections coming from
members of social groups supposed to reciprocate them (high-W). In contrast high-RWA par-
ticipants’ behavior seems to follow the priors derived from the warmth stereotype when inter-
acting with both low- and high-W social groups. The presence of differential discriminatory
tendencies (present for high-W trustees but not for low-W ones) in low-RWA participants
could also be due to differences in stereotype content towards the different social groups and/
or to the stereotype endorsement degree towards them.
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This study has an innovative value because it integrates different research areas ranging
from decision-making to social and political psychology. In particular, we suggest that SCM
social dimensions seem to be not universally employed in the same way. In fact there are mod-
erating variables (as ideological beliefs) that influence SCM dimensions preferential endorse-
ment (e.g., in the multiple-round TG low-RWA participants distrusted high-W players, while
high-RWA participants distrusted low-W ones). Moreover, despite the relationship between
warmth and trustworthiness is already well established (see [66,98]) in the context of SCM the-
ory, trust has been previously measured mainly by employing subjective ratings and not eco-
logically-valid tasks (for exceptions see [29,32,33]).
Importantly, we expand previous knowledge by showing that during social economical
interactions (Experiment 2), perceived warmth but not competence, heavily impacts the deci-
sion to trust (or not) others. Furthermore, warmth information also guides fast behavioral
adjustments during the multiple-round Trust Game. Indeed as the economical interactions
proceed, low-authoritarian participants adjust their investment behavior to other groups’
actual reciprocation by investing less in high-W groups’ representatives. Although this result
may sound counterintuitive, we believe that differential social expectations about low- and
high-W national groups play a key role in explaining this behavioral pattern. In fact, when
receiving a neutral feedback during the Trust Game, low-authoritarian participants go on
investing on low-W groups (expected to behave unfairly since a lack of warmth equals a lack of
reciprocation), but they progressively decide to invest less on high-W groups (supposed to
behave fairly since warmth equals to reciprocation). Probably perceived lack of cooperation
coming from social groups expected to behave trustworthy is particularly bothering for low-
authoritarian players. Interestingly, authoritarian participants kept relying on the reputational
priors derived from the warmth stereotype in order to update (or not) their behavioral strategy
when facing low- and high-W social groups.
Recently, connectionist models of learning have been employed to study attitude forma-
tion and change, with special attention toward intergroup biases. Also in simple neural net-
works false positive expectancies were corrected by experience, but negative prejudices seem
impervious to change [99]. Interestingly, our findings confirm that permeability to external
information when learning about others during economical interactions is modulated by the
ideological attitude of the participants. In fact, egalitarian participants adapted to others’
behavior depending on their priors but also on others’ actual reciprocation behavior, while
authoritarian ones updated their behavioral strategy in the case of negative priors (i.e. low-W
groups), but not in the case of positive priors (high-W groups). Interestingly, these behavioral
patterns are in agreement with the constructs of predictive trust (i.e. a strategic behavior
based on the acquired knowledge about national groups) and altruistic trust (i.e. a decision
based on the believe of the goodwill of that group) [100,101].
We could speculate that in future investigations aimed at measuring how other core ideo-
logical attitudes (like social dominance orientation [42] and beliefs in a just world [41] or per-
sonality traits related to political ideology (like openness to experience, conscientiousness,
neuroticism, intolerance to ambiguity [51,52]) contribute to shape intergroup trust, similar
but not identical behavioral patterns could emerge. In particular, we believe that dissimilar
findings could be found when investigating SDO. RWA and SDO have been in fact proposed
as constructs able to influence prejudice against specific outgroups through different motiva-
tional mechanisms [102]: RWA should trigger negative attitudes toward groups perceived as
threatening social order (e.g., deviant groups) while SDO should cause negative attitudes
toward groups that activate competitiveness over dominance and superiority, for instance
socially subordinate groups low in power and status. Furthermore, individuals high in SDO
are more likely to obtain leader positions and high-RWA participants tend to act as followers
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supporting high-SDO leaders. The dyad high SDO leader-high RWA follower makes decisions
that are more unethical than those made in role-reversed dyads [103]. On the one hand, these
findings suggest that high-SDO participants could show explicit discriminatory tendencies
when playing the TG against low-C social groups. On the other hand, the social groups we
used in our experiment were probably not able to trigger threat in high-RWA participants that
consequently only show explicit discriminatory tendencies towards low-W groups in the mul-
tiple-round version of the TG.
A limitation of our study is that we did not explicitly assess participants’ expectations of
reciprocity for the different social groups, and thus we can only infer their expectations by ana-
lyzing their behavioral patterns. Future research should compare both implicit and explicit
participants’ expectations about social partners’ perceived trustworthiness, reciprocity and
cooperation.
While we investigated intergroup bias in social interactions by means of the Trust Game,
the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon might be involved in other relevant socio-eco-
nomic decisions, e.g., political decisions about monetary policies, redistribution of funds and
payments over sanctions. Future research about social economical interactions in liberal versus
conservative participants should take advantage of other paradigms coming from behavioral
economics in order to better define the role of the multifaceted psychological features at the
base of this ideological divide.
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